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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholar, and later Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. opened his great book, The Common Law, with a statement about how judges
go about deciding cases. He said,
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determin-
ing the rules by which men should be governed. 1
Forty years later, New York Court of Appeals Justice, and later Supreme Court
Justice, Benjamin Cardozo discussed with greater specificity how judges think
in The Nature of the Judicial Process. Cardozo said that judges tend to follow
the logic of existing precedents where that is reasonably possible, but then they
consider history, custom, and the welfare of society.2  This topic about how
Professor of Law, University of the Pacific. McGeorge School of Law. A.B., 1946, Univer-
sity of Chicago: J.D., 1950, University of Chicago Law School; LL.M. 1966, Columbia Law
School: LL.D.. 1966, John Marshall Law School: J.S.D., 1968. Columbia Law School.
- Spurgeon E. Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A. 1976,
University of Chicago; J.D.. 1979. University of Wisconsin Law School.
I OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2 BENJAMINN. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30 31 (1921).
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judges do, and should, decide cases is one of perennial interest, and a number of
recent books have returned to the issue.
In one such book, How Judges Think, Seventh Circuit Judge, and prolif-
ic scholar, Richard Posner discusses how he and other judges that he knows go
about deciding cases.3 In a similar vein, Justice Antonin Scalia and legal scho-
lar Bryan Garner discuss their views about how to persuade judges in The Art of
Persuading Judges.4 In Courts & Congress: America's Unwritten Constitution,
Professor William Quirk discusses how courts have taken over deciding public
policy issues that he feels are more appropriately left to the other branches of
government, Congress, and the President. Thus, the American people are go-
verned by an unwritten Constitution, which Quirk calls "The Happy Conven-
tion." 5 Contra the views of Quirk, in Retained by the People: The "Silent"
Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Americans Don't Know They
Have, Professor Daniel A. Farber argues that the Supreme Court should be more
vigorous than it is today, particularly in protecting individual rights from con-
gressional or executive action through use of the mostly dormant, or "silent,"
6Ninth Amendment. Finally, in Originalism, Federalism, and the American
Constitutional Enterprise, Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr. discusses the various
ways courts have dealt with questions of federalism and limits on federal go-
vernmental power.'
In this Article, we will consider each of these five recent statements on
the topic of judicial decision-making, placing the books into a broader context
of theories on judicial review. As noted in this review,' there are four basic
styles of judicial decision-making: (1) formalism (where literal text is given
great weight); (2) Holmesian (often characterized by deference to government
action and concern for underlying purposes of the law); (3) natural law (empha-
sis on judicial precedent and general principles underlying the law); and (4)
instrumentalism (great attention paid to alternative social policy consequences
of a decision). With regard to constitutional interpretation, formalist judges
focus on sources of meaning existing at the time of ratification - text, context,
and history - with particular focus on literal text. This leads to a static, or
fixed, view of the Constitution based on the textual meaning at the time of rati-
fication. Holmesian judges add to these sources a judicial deference to legisla-
tive, executive, and, to some extent, social practice under the Constitution. Nat-
ural law judges add to these sources great respect for precedent and reasoned
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
4 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008).
5 WILLIAM QUIRK, COURT & CONGRESS: AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 2 (2008).
Quirk explains, "The new, unwritten constitution is called here the Happy Convention." Id.
6 DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007).
7 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007).
8 See infra notes 10 15. 19 30, 38-43 and accompanying text.
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elaboration of the law. Instrumentalist judges add a focus on prudential prin-
ciples. For conservative instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight
paid to prudential principles of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this
typically involves greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy
embedded in the law.
Comparing the five books mentioned above, it is clear that descriptions
and evaluations of what happens in judicial decision-making are influenced by
the observer's perspective on what style of deciding is preferred. Placed in this
perspective, each of these five books makes a good contribution to legal scho-
larship once the predisposition of the author is understood: Posner (conservative
instrumentalist); Justice Scalia (formalist); Professor Quirk (Holmesian); Pro-
fessor Farber (natural law, with a hint of liberal instrumentalism); and Professor
Purcell (liberal instrumentalist). Because his book is in many ways the most
comprehensive of the five, and provides a good introductory overview of the
topic of judicial decision-making, Part II of this Article summarizes and reviews
Judge Posner's book, How Judges Think. Part III addresses the four other books
in the order mentioned above. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
II. JUDGE POSNER AND How JUDGES THINK
Judge Richard Posner's twenty-five years on the bench have produced
many creative and useful contributions in a wide variety of legal fields. 9 On the
topic of judicial decision-making, Judge Posner makes clear, in How Judges
Think, the complexity of his thought when deciding cases. At a minimum,
Posner advises that if a case is not controlled by precedent, an advocate appear-
ing before him should identify the purpose behind the relevant legal principle,
and then show that the purpose would be fulfilled by a decision in favor of the
advocate's position.' 0 More broadly, he suggests from studying the literature
and observing the behavior of other judges that many of them think in a similar
way, which he calls "pragmatism," an approach that goes beyond rules, purpose,
principles, and precedent to emphasize the consequences of deciding a case one
way or another."1 Judge Posner concedes that there are some misguided judges,
which he identifies as "legalists."' 12 He says they behave in errant ways by giv-
ing too much weight to rules and precedents, and they fail to give enough
9 See generally Symposium, Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge Richard Posner,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2007).
10 POSNER, supra note 3, at 220.
1 See id. at 40 ("pragmatism" refers "to basing judgments (legal or otherwise) on conse-
quences, rather than on deduction from premises in the manner of syllogism"). id. at 238 ("The
core of legal pragmatism is pragmatic adjudication. and its core is heightened judicial concern for
consequences and thus a disposition to base policy judgments on them rather than on conceptual-
isms and generalities.").
12 Id. at 41-42.
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weight to the consequences of alternative decisions. 13 That is the most important
consideration for pragmatists, other than possibly a soundly reasoned case di-
rectly on point.'
4
Along the way, Judge Posner recognizes two other groups of judges.
First, there are judges, like Justice Kennedy, who reason, as did Justice Powell
and Chief Justice John Marshall, that there are some overriding general prin-
ciples to which current decisions should be related. 5 And then there are judges
who agree with legalists that law should be clear and certain, but who are will-
ing to look behind rules to their reasons, as did Justice Holmes, and who, like
him, frequently defer to decisions of other branches or the states, as did Chief
Justice Rehnquist and is done by Chief Justice Roberts. 16 In addition, Judge
Posner tells us that most judging is "political," in the sense that it is not simply
the logical application of rules and precedents. 7 That is especially true in the
Supreme Court, he says, where arguments about the consequences of alternative
decisions are far more important than arguments based on rehearsing prece-
dents.' 8 While discussing the Supreme Court as a political institution, Posner
submits that the Justices probably would not do a better job if they decided few-
er cases. 19 He says that deciding cases is not a protracted process, unless the
judge has difficulty making up his mind, "which is a psychological trait rather
than an index of conscientiousness.,, 20 He notes that the decline in cases de-
cided by the Court from 129 in 1958 to sixty-eight in 2006, "has coincided with
an increase in the quality and number of the Justices' law clerks [and] is a dis-
turbing commentary on the effect of bureaucratization on productivity.",2'
As noted, Posner acknowledges four different judicial decision-making
22perspectives. Not surprisingly, his major attention is focused predominantly
on the style of interpretation that he adopts, what he calls "pragmatism."
"Pragmatism" is a form of judicial decision-making also called "instrumental-
ism. ' '23 For such judges, the formulation and application of each rule is tested
13 Id. at 42.
14 Id. at 239-40.
15 Id. at 310 11. For discussion of Justice Kennedy's decision-making style, see notes 93 133
and accompanying text.
16 POSNER, supra note 3, at 287-88. For discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Chief
Justice Roberts' decision-making style, see notes 75 92 and accompanying text.
17 Id. at 9-10.
18 Id. at 269.
19 Id. at 269-70.
20 Id. at 299.
21 Id.
22 See notes 1 0-1 6 and accompanying text.
23 See generally CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 11, 342-43 (2007) (an E-Book available at www.vandeplaspublishing.com); David Lyons,
Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism A Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 956
(1981); Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth-Century American Legal
[Vol. 112
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by its purpose and effects. These judges are willing to engage in a broad-based
historical investigation to help determine overall context and purposes. They
believe that courts should seek to advance sound social policies where leeways
exist in the law, and give less regard to precedent than to reaching sound re-
suIts. 24 On the current Court, Justice Stevens inclines to this view, as do Justic-
es Ginsburg and Breyer, and newly confirmed Justice Sonia Sotomayor; past
champions of this view include Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.2 5 While such instrumentalists on the Su-
preme Court have all been more or less liberal in their approach to policy ques-
tions, Judge Posner provides a good reminder of the possibility that a conserva-
tive law-and-economics approach may be a version of pragmatic instrumental-
ism.,,
"Legalists," as described by Posner, are more commonly described as
"formalists., ' 21 Such judges emphasize the literal, plain meaning of words.
They prefer clear, bright-line rules which are capable of formal, logical, and
predictable application. When using history as an aid, they search for the spe-
cific historical views of the framers and ratifiers on specific issues, and refuse to
speculate on what history may suggest about broader concepts. 28 Justices Sca-
lia, Thomas, and Alito tend to approach constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion cases from this perspective.29
The two other styles of interpretation, which Posner acknowledges but
does not develop in his book, are Holmesian decision-making and natural law• • 30
decision-making. One set of judges, following Justice Holmes, agree with
formalists that the law should be clear and predictable. But they emphasize the
need for judicial restraint and deference to the legislature and the executive, as
Thought A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981).
24 See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23, at 11 13. 47 54, 325 53 (citing GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 98 (1977): KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 213 35 (1960): Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the
Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 215, 217 (1962)).
25 See KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 325 53. 1628 (discussing all of these Justices).
26 Id. at 341-43. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1984);
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Ernest A. Young, Conservative Judicial
Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 1416 (2002).
27 See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 12.
28 Id. at 35-41, 278 302 (citing Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527
942 (1999); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908)): Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988).
29 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23. at 41 47, 278 302. 1626 28 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA.
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION]: Beau James Brock, Mr.
Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 634-49 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)).
3o POSNER. supra note 3, at 232 35.
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well as deference to states. Although they consider the literal meaning of
words, as do formalists, they are willing to look beyond the words, and pragmat-
ically consider general purposes because, as Holmes said, "The life of the lawS ,,31
has not been logic; it has been experience. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opi-
nions embodied this Holmesian style, as do the opinions of Chief Justice Ro-
berts.3
The judicial decision-making style with the oldest pedigree is that of
natural law. These judges endeavor to connect specific decisions and doctrines
with general principles of law, in what is called "reasoned elaboration of the
law." Words in the Constitution that are judged to reflect the adoption of broad
principles, such as federalism or the separation of powers, are interpreted in
light of those principles. There is an effort to develop a reasoned elaboration of
law in light of its purposes and history. In doing so, such judges pay great re-
spect to prior precedents of earlier judges, particularly those engaged in thesameintepretve •33
same interpretive enterprise. Chief Justice John Marshall so reasoned. In re-
cent times, his major heirs have been Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor.34
In addition to his discussion of these various styles of decision-making,
Judge Posner uses his central focus on how judges think as a springboard to
provide information and views on a wide variety of topics which, in one way or
another, bear some relation to judicial thought. For example, we learn that
judges are busy but that most opinions are drafted by law clerks, who are more
legalistic than the judges who decide the cases.35 We also learn his view that
law professors are not currently teaching what is most useful for lawyers to
know about persuading judges. 6 This may be explained by the fact, he says,
that law professors are tending more and more to be subject matter specialists
31 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 41-46, 303-24 (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881); Robert W. Gordon, Holmes'Common Law as Legal and Social Science,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1982); Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflec-
tions on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427. 456 (1990); Yosal Rogat. Mr.
Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254 (1963):; G. Edward White, The Inte-
grity of Holmes'Jurisprudence. 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 655, 667 (1982)).
32 See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note
23, at 303 24. 1621 26.
33 See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 54-62, 354-93 (citing Edward S. Corwin,
The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. I & 3), 42 HARV. L. REV.
149, 365 (1928-29); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (1985); David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court,
and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (1991); H. Jefferson Pow-
ell. The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)).
34 See infra notes 93-136 and accompanying text. See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note
23, at 354 56. 393-404.
35 POSNER, supra note 3, at 221.
36 Id. at 215 19.
[Vol. 112
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and, in the process, are not teaching the kind of information and skills generallyS 37
needed to persuade judges .
Similar insightful conclusions are sprinkled throughout the book. It
would detract from some readers' enjoyment of the book to attempt to list them
all. But here is a sample, drawn from a Chapter on the Supreme Court:
* "Against the decision in Brown it could be argued, first, that if
instead of forbidding public school segregation the Court had
insisted that states practicing segregation spend as much money
per black as per white pupil, the expense of maintaining parallel
public school systems might have forced integration more ra-
pidly than the Court's actual decision, which was not fully im-
plemented for decades. 38
* "If the Justices acknowledged to themselves the essentially
personal, subjective, political, and, from a legalist standpoint,
arbitrary character of most of their constitutional decisions, then
- deprived of 'the law made me do it' rationalization for their
exercise of power - they might be less aggressive upsetters of
political applecarts than they are."39
* "Maybe when all the characteristics of the Court as an institu-
tion are considered - especially the fact that the Justices try to
justify their decisions in reasoned opinions, which, even when
they are advocacy products largely drafted by law clerks wet
behind the ears, reflect a degree of deliberation and a commit-
ment to minimal coherence that are not demanded of legislative
bodies - the correct conclusion is that the Justices' legislative




* Speaking of Justice Breyer's book Active Liberty (2005),
Judge Posner says that, "A Supreme Court Justice writing about
constitutional law theory is like a dog walking on his hind legs;
the wonder is not that it is done well but that it is done at all.'
* "What reins in the Justices is... an awareness, conscious or
unconscious, that they cannot go 'too far' without inviting re-
prisals by the other branches of government spurred on by an
37 Id. at 216-21.
8 ld. at 280.
Id. at 289.
40 Id. at 304-305.
41 Id. at 324.
2010]
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indignant public. So they pull their punches, giving just enough
obeisance to precedent to be able to present themselves as 'real'
judges, rather than as the more than occasional legislators that
they really are."42
This having been said, a more complete book on the nature of the judi-
cial process would have to account fully for all four of the judicial decision-
making styles that Posner identifies, and how they differ in terms of their ap-
proach to common-law decision-making, such as in contracts and torts cases;
statutory interpretation; and constitutional law decision-making. While a good
account of a pragmatic approach to judicial decision-making, Judge Posner's
book does not meet this broader goal. Had he undertaken that inquiry, his book
would have considered in greater depth the various sources of interpretation
used most prominently by formalist, Holmesian, natural law, and instrumentalist
judicial actors.43
With regard to constitutional interpretation, such a detailed description
of constitutional interpretation would note that any interpreter must consider a
wide variety of possibly relevant considerations that will be given different
weight by each of the four styles of decision-making. These considerations, or
sources of constitutional meaning, can be described as follows:
(1) The literal, or plain, meaning of the Constitution's text; and
the text's purpose or spirit;
(2) The context of that text, including verbal or policy maxims
of construction; related provisions in the Constitution or other
related documents, like the earlier enacted Articles of Confede-
ration; and the structure of government contemplated by the
Constitution, including issues of federalism and separation of
powers;
(3) Historical evidence concerning the intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution, both specific historical evidence,
like Notes of the Constitutional Convention or The Federalist
Papers, and general background historical evidence, viewed
both from the perspective of specific historical intent of the
framers and ratifiers and any general aspirations or general in-
tent the framers and ratifiers may have had in mind;
42 Id. at 375.
43 On this broader topic, see generally R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984) (discussing common-law, statutory, and constitutional decision-
making from formalist. Holmesian. natural law, and instrumentalist perspectives) KELSO &
KELSO. supra note 23, at 35 62 (summarizing common-law, statutory. and constitutional deci-
sion-making from formalist, Holmesian. natural law, and instrumentalist perspectives).
[Vol. 112
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(4) Legislative, executive, and social practice under the Consti-
tution;
(5) Judicial precedent interpreting the Constitution; and
(6) Prudential arguments concerning the consequences of a par-
ticular judicial decision, both from the perspective of text, con-
text, history, practice, and precedent, and whether that decision
would advance a particular background principle of justice or
social policy that the judge believes is embedded in the Consti-
tution or constitutional doctrine (more succinctly phrased as
"embedded in the law"), or perhaps a principle of justice or so-
cial policy that is "not so embedded" in the Constitution or ex-
isting constitutional doctrine.
These sources can be organized under two broad headings: contempora-
neous sources of meaning and subsequent considerations. Contemporaneous
sources are those that existed at the time a constitutional provision was ratified.
They include the text of the Constitution; the context of that text, including ver-
bal and policy maxims of construction; related provisions in the Constitution or
other related documents; the structure of government contemplated by the Con-
stitution (structural arguments of federalism and separation of powers); and the
history surrounding the provision's drafting and ratification. Subsequent con-
siderations involve matters that occur after the constitutional provision is rati-
fied. These include the sub-categories of (a) subsequent events, which involve
legislative, executive, and social practice under the Constitution, and judicial
precedent interpreting the Constitution; and (b) prudential considerations, which
involve judicial consideration of the consequences of any judicial construction,
including arguments of justice or social policy.
These sources can be organized by resorting to whether they involve
relatively specific and limited interpretive tasks or resorting to more general
kinds of reasoning. Table I may clarify these various sources of interpreta-
tion.44
44 A complete discussion of these sources of constitutional interpretation and their use appears
at KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 99-133 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288 (1936)). See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (similar discussion of text, structure. history. doctrinal.
prudential. and ethical considerations in constitutional interpretation).
2010]
9
Kelso and Kelso: Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The State of the De
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Table 1










More Specific Interpretive Tasks




(1) Specific Historical Intent
(2) General Historical Intent
General Kinds of Reasoning




(1) Specific Historical Intent
(2) General Historical Intent
Legislative or Executive Practice Social Practice
Core Holdings of Precedent Reasoned Elaboration of Law
Judicial Restraint Considerations Other Prudential Concerns
(Ia) Text (e.g., prudential principles (2) Practice & Precedent;
of standing, ripeness, mootness) (3) Principles of Justice and/
(Ib) Context/Structure (e.g., political or Social Policy Embedded
questions and Ashiiander factors
in the Law(Ic) Purpose/History (4) Justice and/or Social
(e.g., sensitivity to the needs of government)Policy Not So Embedded
In general, formalists/legalists focus on contemporaneous sources of
meaning, particularly literal text, which leads to a static, or fixed, view of the
Constitution based on the textual meaning at the time of ratification. 45 Holme-
sian judges add to contemporaneous sources a judicial deference to later legisla-
46tive, executive, and, to some extent, social practice. Natural law judges add to
these sources great respect for precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law. 4
Instrumentalist judges add a focus on prudential principles. For conservative
instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight paid to prudential prin-
ciples of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this typically involves
45 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23. at 278 302 (citing INTERPRETATION. supra note 29. at
44 (the alternative view of "The Living Constitution," which changes meaning based on later
legislative, executive, or social practice; or later judicial precedents; or prudential considerations,
is incompatible with the "antievolutionary purpose of a constitution")).
46 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 303 24 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (our tradition derives from both "our people and our
laws."); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976);
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 144 (1893)).
47 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 325-53 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887-902 (1985); David M. O'Brien, The
Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Jnterpretiv-
ism, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 145 (1991) ("'[A]mong the obvious and just guides applicable to
[interpreting] the Const[itutio]n.' Madison listed: '1. The evils [and] defects for curing which the
Constitution was called for & introduced. 2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted.
3. The early, deliberate, and continued practice under the Constitution ....
[Vol. 112
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greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy embedded in the
law. 48 These predispositions are reflected in the following Table:
Table 2
Sources of Constitutional Meaning and Styles of Interpretation
Interpretation Main Focus of
Style Interpretation Style
More Specific






Text Literal or Plain Meaning of Text Purpose or Spirit of Text
Context Verbal Maxims Policy Maxims
Related Provisions Structural Arguments
History Specific Historical Evidence General Historical Evidence
(1) Specific Historical Intent (1) Specific Historical Intent
(2) General Historical Intent (2) General Historical Intent
Subsequent Considerations
Practice Legislative or Executive Practice Social Practice
Precedent Core Holdings of Precedent Reasoned Elaboration of Law
Prudential Consequences Evaluated in Consequences Evaluated in
Considerations light of Text, Context/Structure, light of Practice and Precedent;
and Purpose/History, mostly background Principles of Justice
focused on Judicial Restraint and/or Social Policy Embedded
in the Law; or Not So Embedded
A third way to think about the four judicial decision-making styles is to
note that, jurisprudentially, there are two main questions that lie behind any act
of judicial interpretation. The first concerns the nature of law, and the second
concerns the nature of the judicial task. Concerning the nature of law, two main
approaches have appeared in jurisprudential writings. Under one approach, law
is seen as primarily a set of rules and principles whose application is guided by
48 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 354-404. A complete discussion of these predisposi-
tions of the four judicial decision-making styles appears at id. at 134 72. Note that while con-
servative instrumentalists may share with Holmesian judges a policy ofjudicial restraint and defe-
rence to government, a conservative formalist will be driven more by the formalist focus on literal
text and historical meaning at the time of ratification, not judicial deference or restraint. Thus,
formalist judges do not necessarily have a policy of judicial restraint. As has been noted about
formalist Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to strike down fed-
eral affirmative action provisions, state affirmative action plans, measures designed to promote
minority ownership of media, campaign finance legislation that attempts to redress wealth inequi-
ties in the political process, portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, part of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, legislative attempts to promote minority representation, laws protecting wom-
en from violence, and laws protecting gays. the aged, and the disabled from discrimination. They
have found constitutional violations in the actions of local communities seeking to protect their
citizens from flooding, congestion, and environmental damage. They have even argued that the
efforts of all fifty states to fund legal services for the poor by using the interest from a pooled
account of lawyers' trust funds which could not earn interest for their owners, was nevertheless an
unconstitutional taking even though the owners suffered no economic loss. See also William P.
Marshall, The Judicial Nomination Wars, 39 U. RiCH. L. REv. 819, 827 28 (2005). In a number of
these cases, including campaign finance litigation, Chief Justice Rehnquist. from his more Holme-
sian perspective, has voted to uphold the law.
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an analytic methodology of logic and reason. This has been called the analytic,
or conceptualist, approach. Alternatively, law can be seen as ultimately to be
judged, not in terms of logical consistency, but as a means to some social end
through a pragmatic or functional treatment of rules and principles. This has
been called the functional, or pragmatic, approach. The second main question
any judge must ask before deciding how to resolve a legal dispute is whether
judicial decision-making should be separable from morals or social values, i.e.,
should judges view law solely as a body of rules and principles from which le-
gal conclusions are derived - the positivist assumption - or should judges
view law as a body of rules and principles testable by reference to some external
standard of rightness, some social or moral value - law as normative or pre-
scriptive, not descriptive. Combining the two different views on the nature of
law (analytic versus functional) and the nature of the judicial task (positivist
versus normative) results in the four decision-making styles, as indicated in Ta-
ble 3:
Table 3
Styles of Judicial Decision-Makin2
Nature of Judicial Task 4 Positivism: Normativism:
Judges as Neutral Judges as
Declarers of the Law Normative Actors
Nature of Law
Law as Logical; Formalism/ Natural Law
Analytic or Analytic Positivism
Conceptualist Attitude;
Law as Library Science
Law as Means to Ends; Holmesian/ Instrumentalism
Functional or Functional Positivism
Pragmatic Approach;
Law as Empirical Science
Often judges who adopt the positivist assumption of the judicial role be-
lieve that law is a science to be governed by the analytic methodology of logic
and reason. These are the formalists. In contrast, many judges who adopt the
normative view of the judicial role believe that law is to be judged in practical
terms as a means to advance that normative end. These are the instrumentalists.
Formalism and instrumentalism, thus, tend to be the two decision-making styles
that judges, and commentators, focus on most. As Table 3 indicates, however, a
complete typography of judicial decision-making styles must take Holmesian
and natural law decision-making into account.49
This typography of judicial decision-making styles can help organize
and critique the other books on judicial review. We turn next to that task.
49 Full discussion of this point appears in KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, Ch. 2 3; R. Randall
Kelso. Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Ap-
proaches to Judicial Decision-Making. 20 PEPP. L. REv. 531. 534 52 (1992).
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III. THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW ON
CRITIQUES OF MODERN COURTS
A. Justice Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner and the Four Decision-Making
Styles
In The Art of Persuading Judges,50 Justice Antonin Scalia and legal au-
thor Bryan A. Garner have written an interesting and informative book about the
art of persuading judges. Following their own advice to be clear, use informa-
tive headings, and make it interesting, the co-authors of this concise treatise
describe precisely what to aim for when attempting to persuade a judge and how
to get there. Brief enough to be read in a few hours, the book can usefully rest
at hand when a lawyer is preparing written submissions or readying for oral
argument.
Lawyers who are called upon to engage in the art of persuasion will find
the book an interesting read and a useful source to consult. The advice has a
common-sense quality to it, and, of course, Justice Scalia has had many years to
observe the process up close and personal. His co-author, Bryan Garner, has
studied and taught advocacy to lawyers for many years. Their combination is a
high-powered source of well-crafted ideas.
The major drawback of the book is that the authors discuss only two
styles of judicial decision-making, not the four discussed in Part II, and thus
their discussion is incomplete. Several times in the book, the co-authors refer to
the source of legal decision-making as one or the other of two forces, which
they describe as "textualism" (the formalist/legalist model discussed in Part II)
versus "purposivism" (the instrumentalist model discussed in Part II). However,
as discussed in Part II, there are four basic judicial decision-making styles of
which an advocate must be aware - the two Scalia and Garner mention, tex-
tualism/formalism and purposivism/instrumentalism, and two others, Holmesian
decision-making and natural law. 51 A complete analysis of the art of persuading
judges must take all four judicial decision-making styles into account.
Before addressing this aspect of the book, it must be noted that most of
the effective advocacy points made by Scalia and Garner apply to any judicial
decision-making style. The book first explains general principles of argumenta-
tion and legal reasoning that apply to briefs and oral argument. Regarding
briefs, the book covers preparatory steps, the writing process, brief architecture
and strategy, and writing style.52 For oral argument, the analysis is more de-
tailed, covering long-term preparation, deciding who will argue, early prepara-
50 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4. Antonin Scalia is an Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court. Bryan Garner is author of Garner's Modern American Usage (2003) and The
Elements of Legal Style (2002) and Editor in Chief of Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004);
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
51 See supra notes 22-32, 43-48 and accompanying text.
52 SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 4. at 5 136, 137 206 (oral arguments).
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tion, readying yourself for oral argument, the substance and manner of an oral
argument, handling questions, and behavior after the argument. Again following
their own advice, the co-authors throughout have used informational headings to
make clear the ideas which are to come.
The twenty-one items of advice on general principles of argumentation
cannot be compressed without losing some of their flavor. But, overall, there is
a call for understanding (the case, the jurisdiction, the judge, and the adversary's
case); for accuracy, brevity, and clarity; for logical presentation (best argument
first, issues before facts, appeal to rules, justice, and common sense, closing
with what the court should do); and for avoiding distractions (overstating the
case or making an overt appeal to emotions).5 3 Advice on legal reasoning is
dealt with more concisely. The authors recommend to find a rule that works
together logically with the facts of the case. Look for it in legislation or case
law. Always begin your presentation with the words of authoritative texts. Be
prepared to use rules of interpretation and/or legislative history. Try to find an
54explicit statement of your major premise in governing or persuasive cases.
Advice on briefing is provided in twenty-seven suggestions, beginning
with the idea that the purpose of a brief is to bring out your theory of the case
and your main themes in order to make it easier for the court to decide as you
wish. Being able to craft such a document begins much earlier by developing an
appealing style and a broad vocabulary through widespread reading of good
55prose.
The book also notes that a brief should be written from an outline and
repeatedly revised. The format and structure should follow the rules of the court
and local practice. The most important single part is often a statement of the
questions presented in such form as to suggest an answer favoring your case.
On writing style, the authors say to value clarity above all other elements. Sec-
tion headings should be informative. Use scrupulous accuracy when dealing
with authorities. And there are a number of things to be avoided, such as jar-
gon, needless Latin, acronyms, and poor typography.56
Garner advises to put no substantive point in a footnote 7 Scalia, quali-
fying, says if the court is accustomed to issuing detailed opinions, some unim-
portant matters can be discussed below the text.58 Again, Garner advises to put
nothing in a footnote beyond what might be consulted in looking up a refer-
53 Id. at 1 38.
54 Id. at 39-55.
55 Id. at 57 136.
56 Id. at 107 36.
57 Id. at 129.
58 Id. at 130.
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ence. 5 9 Scalia prefers to have full citations in the text because judges are famili-
60ar with that technique and many are uncomfortable with change.
The authors devote sixty-three items to oral argument, assuming that
many judges who are undecided at the time of argument may be led to a deci-
sion by the information and perspectives it provides, particularly the opportunity
for questions to be asked and answered. An oral argument begins long before
arriving in court, they say, by preparations for public speaking and choosing the
skilled advocate most familiar with the case. During weeks before the argu-
ment, the advocate should learn the case quite well and have a clear theory of
the case and the judicial mandate that is sought. Moot courts should be con-
61ducted. On the eve of argument, check authorities for late developments.
Be properly attired, the authors state, and arrive in court early with all
your materials. Approach the lectern unencumbered and make eye contact with
the court, providing a customary greeting and introducing yourself, if necessary.
Have your opening remarks "down pat." Lead with your strongest argument. If
you have nothing useful left to say, conclude even though you have time left.
62
As to the manner of delivery, the authors say, flatly, that the argument
should never be read and is better delivered if not memorized except, perhaps,
the opener and the closer. Present the argument as if it were the truth rather than
your opinion. Avoid distracting habits such as chewing your fingernails. Ques-
tions should be welcomed. If you do not fully understand a question, ask for
clarification. If you do not know, say so. Try to begin with a "yes" or "no," and
then explain or qualify. Try to recognize when a judge has asked you a friendly
63question. Beware of conceding anything.
After the argument, advise the court of any significant new authorities.
Evaluate your performance in an effort to learn from any mistakes and help
64
yourself toward building a reputation for excellence in the art of advocacy.
The book concludes by suggesting that you not consider each case in isolation
but, rather, as a platform from which to build on your successes. They say,
"Argue not just for the day but for reputation. 65
As indicated above, 66 several times in the book the co-authors refer to
the source of legal decision-making as one or the other of two forces. For ex-
ample, early in the book there is a reference to stare decisis as compared with a
drive toward fairness to litigants, socially desirable results in the case at hand,
and the adoption of a rule that will produce fairness, socially desirable results,
59 Id. at 132.
60 Id. at 134.
61 Id. at 137-60.
62 Id. at 173.
63 Id. at 178 200.
64 Id. at 206.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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67and predictability in future cases. Again, a page later, a dichotomy is pre-sented:
Some judges believe that their duty is quite simply to give the
text its most natural meaning - in the context of related provi-
sions, of course, and applying the usual canons of textual inter-
pretation - without assessing the desirability of the conse-
quences that meaning produces. At the other extreme are those
judges who believe it their duty to give the text whatever per-
missible meaning will produce the most desirable results.68
In discussing judicial philosophy - what it is that leads judges to draw
conclusions - the options suggested are "Primarily text, or primarily policy?"
or "Is the judge strict or lax on stare decisis? Does the judge love or abhor ref-
erences to legislative history?,' 69 Later, there is a reference to "textualists" rely-
ing on the words of a statute and "purposivists" gravitating in another direc-
tion.7°
"Textualists," as described by Scalia and Garner, are more commonly
described as "formalists."' 71 "Purposivists," as described by Scalia and Garner,
are more commonly identified as "instrumentalists. 72 As discussed in Part II,
two additional styles beyond those identified by Scalia and Garner need to be
considered by modern advocates: Holmesian decision-making, with its focus on
deference to legislative and executive action; 73 and natural law decision-making,
with its focus on precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law.74
Bearing in mind that arguments need to be addressed to all the styles
likely to have some influence on the decision of a judge or judges, an advocate
needs to go beyond the textualist/formalist and purposive/instrumentalist styles
of interpretation. To help Holmesian judges reach decisions, advocates should
indicate why deference should or should not be given to decisions of other
branches of government, or by individuals as a matter of deference to social
practice. To help modern natural law judges reach a favorable decision, an ef-
fort needs to be made to connect arguments to a reasoned elaboration of general
principles of law and to pay great respect to existing judicial precedents.
67 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at xxi.
68 Id. at xxii.
69 Id. at 5.
70 Id. at51.
71 See generally supra notes 27 29 and accompanying text.
72 See generally supra notes 23 26 and accompanying text.
73 See generally supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
74 See generally supra notes 33 34 and accompanying text.
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With respect to the Holmesian style of deciding cases, there are many
examples in the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The late Chief Justice
wrote for the Court in a number of cases wherein a key factor was the wisdom,
as he saw it, of deferring to actions by another branch of government. This list
of such cases is long.75 Only a sample is covered here.
In Rostker v. Goldberg,76 the Court upheld draft registration limited to
males.7  Men subject to the draft claimed a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized
the customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress, especially to leg-
islative judgments in the area of military affairs, an area in which the Court has
admitted a relative lack of judicial competence. Further, in view of Congress's
extended deliberations, the exemption of women from registration was not an
accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about women, but a con-
sidered judgment to which judicial deference was appropriately applied.
78
In Sosna v. Iowa,79 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in
upholding a one-year durational residence requirement for obtaining a divorce
in Iowa. Refusing to apply the strict scrutiny called for by dissenting instrumen-
talist Justices Marshall and Brennan, Justice Rehnquist said that the state had
made precisely the sort of determination that a state is entitled to make, in that it
had not only effectuated state substantive policy calling for more than a consti-
tutional minimum of connection with the state, but also provided a greater safe-
guard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of nothing
more than bona fide residence.8 °
75 An overview of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Holmesian style of decision-making appears at
KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 303 24. Of course, this observation does not mean that Chief
Justice Rehnquist, or his successor Chief Justice Roberts, who also tends to follow a Holmesian
style of decision-making (see infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text) will defer to the govern-
ment in every case. Sometimes government action is clearly unconstitutional. Even in that case,
however, the doctrine, as propounded by a Holmesian, tends to be as limited as possible in its
application. For example, in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court striking down Congress's attempt to use the Commerce Clause to regulate all
guns around schools. Under the doctrine as phrased in Lopez, Congress can regulate. and does
regulate today, guns around schools as long as the gun has moved in interstate commerce, which
is true for most guns, since most guns are not manufactured, sold, and possessed in one state only.
Similarly, in United States v. Alforrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court striking down Congress's attempt to use the Commerce Clause to make constitutional
the Violence Against Women Act, later congressional statutes regulating various kinds of violent
activity, such as Hate Crimes statutes, or the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, still remain active
on the statute books today.
76 453 U.S. 57, 78-83 (1981).
77 Id. at 83.
78 Id. at 80 82.
79 419 U.S. 393, 410-14 (1975); Id. at 418 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 408-09.
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In Sandin v. Conner, 81 Rehnquist wrote for the Court in abandoning a
rule that defined a prisoner's protected liberty interests on the basis of whether
there was mandatory language in the text of prison regulations 2.8  The Chief
Justice replaced that rule with the test of whether the prison has imposed atypi-
cal and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.8 3 This rule clearly gives prison authorities more discretion than did
the previous rule, at least where there are written prison regulations.
Chief Justice Roberts appears to closely resemble Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in that he also approaches cases from the Holmesian model of interpreta-
tion. Many of his decisions while on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals suggest
that approach.8 4 Examples also appear in his opinions as Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. For example, in Morse v. Frederick, 8 5 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts deferred to the judgments of a school's principal. In Morse, the
Court upheld sanctioning a student who, at a school-sanctioned and supervised
event, held up a banner saying "BONG HITS 4 JESUS." '  Stating that Con-
gress has declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use and that school principals have a difficult and vitally
important job, the Chief Justice concluded that the principal could reasonably
have found that the banner constituted promotion of illegal drug use in violation
of established school policy. This was enough to permit school regulation under
deferential rational basis review. The Chief Justice added that the First
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate student expression at school
events that contributes to the dangers of illegal drug use. 87 Reflecting a perspec-
tive not as deferential to schools, Justice Kennedy joined with Justice Alito in a
concurrence that focused more on reasoned elaboration of free speech doc-
trine.88 They noted that if the speech were not connected to the school-
sanctioned event, and was student-generated speech, then the intermediate stan-
dard of review of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
would apply, even if the speech conflicted with the educational mission of the
school.89
s 515 U.S. 472. 477 87 (1995).
82 Id. at 474-75.
83 Id. at 484.
84 See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23, at 1620 26.
85 551 U.S. 393, 401-10 (2007).
86 Id. at 397.
87 Id. at 403.
88 Id. at 422-25. (Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
89 Id. (Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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In Runsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,90
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, upholding the Solomon
Amendment. That Act cut off federal funds to institutions that deny military
recruiters access equal to that provided by the institution to any other employ-
er.91 Deferring to judgments of the legislative branch, the Chief Justice said that
Congress could have ordered schools to accept military recruiters and so could
also accomplish that result by conditions on spending. The Act did not violate
the plaintiff law schools' freedom of speech, said the Chief Justice, because the
schools need not say anything; they need not agree with any speech of recrui-
ters; and they are not restricted in what they may say about the military's poli-
cies.92
Almost all of Justice Kennedy's opinions, as a modern natural law
judge, make an effort to connect his reasoning with some general principles of
constitutional law, such as the separation of powers or the need to protect liber-
ty. In order to help Justice Kennedy decide a close case, an advocate would be
well advised to seek such connections because Kennedy's view prevailed in all
twenty-five of the 5-4 cases decided in the 2006 Term of the Court, and he re-
mains the key swing vote on the Court today. 93 There follows a few examples
of how Justice Kennedy's reasoning differs somewhat from that of his formalist,
Holmesian, or instrumentalist colleagues.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 94 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
said that Congress could not create standing in "any person" to bring an action
to enjoin any government instrumentality alleged to be in violation of the En-
dangered Species Act. 95 Scalia said the literal text of the Constitution provides
that it is the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted. '96 Rejecting such literalism and adopting a view consistent with prece-
dents, Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Souter,
said that Congress could identify an injury it seeks to vindicate and relate that
injury to a class of persons entitled to bring suit. 97 But he agreed with Justice
Scalia that the individuals had to establish a clear injury in fact. If a suit were
allowed without requiring concrete injury, the vitality of the adversarial process
would not be preserved, and the Judicial Branch would not be confined to its
limited role in the constitutional framework of government.98
90 547 U.S. 47. 51 70 (2006).
91 Id. at 55.
92 Id. at 60.
93 See generally The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REv. 436, 442 (2007 08): Erwin Chemerinsky.
The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 335 (2006).
94 504 U.S. 555, 573-77 (1992); id. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 557 58.
96 Id. at 577.
97 Id. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 581 (Kennedy. J.. concurring).
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In Clinton v. City of New York,99 the Court invalidated the Line Item
Veto Act, saying that the Constitution did not authorize the President to repeal
or amend parts of duly enacted statutes. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court
emphasized that the procedures for enactment of federal legislation, which did
not authorize such action, were the product of great debates and compromises
that produced the Constitution.100 Justice Kennedy, concurring, provided fur-
ther reasoned elaboration of the principle behind such a view. He noted that a
law which gives the President sole ability to favor one group or another threat-
ens liberty as does any concentration of power in the hands of a single branch. 1 01
The idea and promise of the separation of powers doctrine is that one branch of
government ought not possess the power to shape the people's destiny without a
sufficient check from the other two. 102
In Grutter v. Bollinger,10 3 a 5-4 Court upheld the affirmative action
program in student admissions at the University of Michigan Law School.
0 4
The majority said that it was applying strict scrutiny, but, in doing so, said that it
deferred to the law school's educational judgment in making academic deci-
sions. 0 5 Justice Kennedy, dissenting, said that when strict scrutiny is properly
applied to a university admissions program that is attempting to attain a critical
mass of minority students, deference should not be given with respect to the
methods by which individual consideration of applicants is preserved. He said
that the law school had made no effort to guard against the danger that race
would become the predominant factor as the school neared the end of the admis-
sions season. 16 To Kennedy, giving deference and not closely examining the
evidence merely because of a policy preference in favor of race-based affirma-
tive action, such as occurred in the majority opinion, joined by instrumentalist
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, was a departure from strict scrutiny, and
would perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race was designed
to avoid. 10 7 Kennedy similarly applied standard strict scrutiny to strike down
the school's affirmative action program in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,108 while departing from the formalist
reasoning of Justice Scalia that any affirmative action program violates the liter-
99 524 U.S. 417. 438-49 (1998).
1oo Id. at 439.
101 Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 450 52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 539 U.S. 306, 322-36 (2003).
104 Id. at 343-44.
105 Id. at 326.
106 Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 388 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108 551 U.S. 701, 782 98 (2007) (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). On Justice Scalia's views, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200. 239
(1995) (Scalia. J.. concurring in the judgment).
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al command for equal treatment expressed in the Equal Protection Clause. In
Romer v. Evans, 109 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court needed to recon-
cile the principle that no person shall be denied equal protection of the law with
the practical need that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another.
The Court's precedents reflect this balance by providing that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, a legislative classifica-
tion will be upheld so long as it bears a rational relation to a legitimate end."'0
Applying that standard, Justice Kennedy invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2,
which, as interpreted by Justice Kennedy and the other Justices in the majority,
operated to repeal and forbid all laws or policies providing specific protection
for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado govern-
ment.1 Kennedy concluded that the law was so broad that it lacked a rational
relationship to any legitimate interests. He said that the law was so far removed
from the state's expressed concerns about liberties of landlords or employers
who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality that it is impossible
to credit those alleged objectives, and therefore the law only reflected animus
toward gays and lesbians." 2 Following a long line of precedents, which had
held that mere animus towards groups is an illegitimate interest,11 3 the Colorado
Amendment was therefore held unconstitutional.
In Lawrence v. Texas, " 4 Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that Texas
could not make homosexual sodomy a criminal offence.' 5  For a majority
comprised of instrumentalist Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and natural
law Justices Kennedy and Souter, Kennedy held that intimate decisions concern-
ing physical relationships are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and there is no legitimate state interest
which could justify the intrusion of this law into the personal and private life of
individuals where the criminal barrier does not involve minors, persons who
might be injured or coerced, public conduct, prostitution, or a formal recogni-
tion of relationships, and which does involve two adults who, with full and mu-
tual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homo-
109 517 U.S. 620, 627-35 (1996).
110 Id. at 633.
Id. at 635 36.
112 Id. at 635.
H, See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding
that prejudice against the mentally impaired an illegitimate governmental interest); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that prejudice against interracial marriage an illegiti-
mate governmental interest); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (holding that animus toward "hippies" wishing to live in a commune an illegitimate go-
vernmental interest).
114 539 U.S. 558, 566-72, 575 (2003) (Kennedy, J., opinion for the Court).
115 Id. at 575 77.
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sexual lifestyle.11 6 In defending this result, Justice Kennedy wrote that a rea-
soned elaboration of the Court's precedents
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial pro-
tection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex .... When homosexual con-
duct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and private spheres .... [T]his
demeans the lives of homosexual persons." 7
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy held that the state had no legiti-
mate interest in regulating their consensual sexual practices, and that any state
regulation reflected mere "animus" toward them." 8 Justice Kennedy relied in
part upon broader arguments of social practice, including the "values we share
with a wider civilization," and opinions of "the European Court of Human
Rights."' 9 He further noted that, while twenty-four states and the Districts of
Columbia had statutes banning sodomy in 1983, by 2003 legislative practice had
changed, with only nine states banning sodomy generally and four states, in-
cluding Texas, banning only homosexual sodomy. 1
20
Adopting a greater focus on historical customs and traditions, typical for
a formalist judge focused on contemporaneous sources of meaning existing at
the time a constitutional provision was ratified, and reflecting a greater focus on
deference to government, typical for a Holmesian judge, Justice Scalia stated in
his dissent, joined by formalist Justice Thomas and Holmesian Chief Justice
Rehnquist,
[A]n "emerging awareness" is by definition not "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition[s]". . . . Many Americans
[still] do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual
conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their
children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders
in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and
their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral. '
2'
116 Id. at 578.
117 Id. at 572-75.
18 Id. at 568-69.
119 Id. at 573.
120 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-98.
121 Id. at 598, 602 (Scalia. J.. joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the clearest difference between the four styles of interpretation
appeared in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.122 There, in a 5-4 decision, the
Court decided not to overrule Roe v. Wade. Justices Scalia, with Justices Rehn-
quist, White, and Thomas, dissented on that matter. Adopting a formalist ap-
proach, Justice Scalia said that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental
liberty to abort an unborn child because of two facts: "(1) the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about it [formalist focus on literal text], and (2) the
longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally pro-
scribed [formalist focus on historical traditions]."123
The same Justices also joined in a dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist.1
24
That dissent tracked Justices Rehnquist and White's Holmesian deference-to-
government dissents in Roe twenty years earlier. The fact that a sizable number
of states as a matter of legislative and executive practice banned abortion be-
tween 1868 and 1973 formed the basis of Justice White's and Justice Rehn-
quist's Holmesian dissents in Roe, given the great deference of Holmesians to
legislative and executive practice. Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe:
By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial
legislatures limiting abortion. While many States have amended
or updated their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 re-
main in effect today. Indeed, the Texas statute struck down to-
day was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and 'has
remained substantially unchanged to the present time.' 125
Justice White noted in his dissent in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bol-
ton:
The upshot [of Roe] is that the people and the legislatures of the
50 States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative
importance of the continued existence and development of the
fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts
on the mother, on the other hand .... This issue, for the most
part, should be left with the people and to the political processes
the people have devised to govern their affairs. 
126
122 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a fuller discussion of the four decision-making styles as reflected
in Casey, see R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Supreme Court: The Joint
Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637 (2002).
123 Casey. 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J.. joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
124 Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ.. dissenting).
125 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 176-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126 410 U.S. 219. 222 (White, J.. joined by Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
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Agreeing with the instrumentalist approach of Roe, Justice Blackmun
would have had the Court not disturb Roe's holding in any respect. 127 Justice
Stevens, also supporting Roe, said that it protected a woman's freedom to decide
matters of the highest privacy and most personal nature. 128
The outcome of the case thus depended on the views of Justices O'Con-
nor, Kennedy, and Souter. These three Justices joined in a rare joint opinion,
parts of which were likely authored by each of the three Justices, but the opinion
was not specifically authored by any one Justice. The joint opinion opened by
rejecting a formalist view that the textually specific protections of the Bill of
Rights and the customs and traditions of states at the time of ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment mark the outer limits of liberty protected by due
process. Ultimately, they said, it comes down to "reasoned judgment" - the
hallmark of the natural law style. 29 Attempting to describe the central core of
privacy doctrine, the joint opinion said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education .... These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.... At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. 1
30
As to whether, with respect to abortion, a state can have an interest suf-
ficient to proscribe it entirely, the joint opinion said that a woman's suffering is
too intimate and personal for the state to insist, without more, upon its own vi-
sion of a woman's role. With respect to reservations about reaffirming the cen-
tral holding of Roe, the authors said they were outweighed by their analysis of
individual liberty combined with the force of stare decisis. Here, stare decisis
was not outweighed by any concern about whether Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided, because the case has not proved unworkable; people have relied on the
decision; no evolution of legal principle had weakened its doctrinal footings; its
127 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 24 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part.
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
128 Id. at 911-15 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The instrumen-
talist nature of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe is addressed more fully at KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 23. at 1267 70.
129 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
130 Id. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy. and Souter).
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factual underpinnings remain intact; it has been expressly reaffirmed several
times; and overruling might be perceived as a surrender to political pressure.131
Having refused to overrule the central principle that a woman has a right
to terminate her pregnancy before viability, the joint opinion substituted an "un-
due burden" test for determining when the fundamental right had been violated
- the question being whether a state regulation has "the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
non-viable fetus., 1 32 The opinion then applied that test to the state law in ques-
tion, striking down a requirement of spousal notification, but upholding, under
rational review, requirements of written informed consent, providing certain
information to the patient, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, required record
keeping, and a parental consent provision for women under eighteen, with a
judicial bypass. 1
33
In contrast to this approach, the instrumentalist opinions of Justices Ste-
vens and Blackmun in Planned Parenthood v. Casey followed Roe v. Wade in
its entirety, making every burden on abortion rights subject to strict scrutiny.
This constitutionalized, under strict scrutiny, all regulations on abortion, follow-
ing Roe's concern about specific harm if a pro-choice position were not
adopted. 134 This approach differed from the natural law approach of the joint
opinion in Casey, where the Court did not sit as a super-legislature regarding all
aspects of abortion regulation. Thus, the specific harm paragraph in Roe was
not present in Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's joint opinion in Casey,
and not every regulation of abortion was constitutionalized under Roe's strict
scrutiny approach. 1
35
More generally, the importance of the undue burden analysis in the joint
opinion in Casey was to ensure that not every abortion regulation triggered strict
scrutiny, and thus the Court did not act as a policy-making super-legislature,
second-guessing every aspect of abortion regulation - an approach more like
an instrumentalist, social policy style of decision-making. Rather, strict scrutiny
was restricted in Casey to protecting the core principle of personal liberty from
undue burdens.
131 See generally id. at 854-64. Under this approach, there is a heavy burden to justify over-
ruling a precedent. See generally R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court
is Dealing With Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973 (1996).
132 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
133 See generally id. at 874 901.
134 Id. at 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 929-34 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(Blackmun. J., for the Court) ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care.").
135 Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 934-40 (Blackmun, J., opinion) (strict scrutiny applied to all of
the legislative regulations in Casey), with id. at 879 901 (joint opinion in Casey) (rational review
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It could be argued, given the literal text in Casey, which stated that "[i]n
our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden," 
1 36
that the joint opinion in Casey summarily concluded that the spousal notification
provision was unconstitutional once it was held to be an undue burden. The
better analysis of Casey, consistent with the general structure of fundamental
rights analysis, is that when the joint opinion stated it was upholding the core
holding of Roe, that meant a court should apply Roe's strict scrutiny analysis to
undue burdens on abortion rights. This would mean that where the state has a
compelling interest to regulate, such as to protect maternal health from the first
trimester on, or to protect pre-natal life after viability, a narrowly tailored statute
directly related to advancing that interest and employing the least burdensome
effective alternative would be constitutional even if it placed a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of the woman seeking to obtain an abortion.
In light of the four methods of decision-making, Justice Scalia and
Bryan Garner could have included several additional items in their section on
the General Principles of Argumentation. Addressed to Holmesians, one would
be "Invite consideration of the extent to which deference to governmental deci-
sionmakers is appropriate." Addressed to natural law Justices, a second would
be "Advise on how your position links to basic legal principles and a reasoned
elaboration of the law." A third would be "Advise how your position is consis-
tent with existing judicial precedents or can meet the heavy burden of justifying
the overruling of precedent."' 137 And a fourth, appropriate for a formalist, as
well as for a Holmesian or natural law judge, and perhaps implicit in Scalia and
Garner's book, but useful to state explicitly, would be "Invite consideration of
the extent to which it is important that the law be precise and predictable." That
consideration is one on which formalist, Holmesian, and natural law judges all
138agree.
136 Id. at 877.
137 On the reasons to overrule a precedent, and the heavy burden a natural law judge requires
before overruling, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
138 See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 40 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)); id. at 42 (citing Patrick J. Kelley, Was
Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflections on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. L.J. 427, 456
(1990) ("Holmes believed a judge could do a number of things to improve the law within the
limits imposed by his society's prevailing beliefs. First, a judge can increase the effectiveness of
current law in achieving its socially desirable consequences by making it more fixed, definite, and
certain.")); id. at 58 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1975)
(The doctrine [natural law] demands, we might say, articulate consistency.")).
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B. Professor Quirk and Holmesian Decision-Making
In Courts & Congress, Professor William Quirk presents a theory about
how the federal government works, showing its unfortunate consequences, and
calling on the American people to do something that might improve the situa-
tion. 1 39 Quirk's theory is that in order not to risk incumbency, the members of
Congress have abandoned to the President their responsibilities for matters relat-
ing to war and peace, and have allowed the Court to be the final word on the
most important cultural and social controversies - even though Congress could
control the Court by using the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. An unfortu-
nate consequence of all this, says Quirk, is that the people are not controlling
policy through their representatives in Congress, as was intended by the framers.
Instead, foreign affairs are largely in the hands of one person, and domestic af-
fairs are left to unelected Justices. Thus, the American people are governed by
an unwritten Constitution, which Quirk calls "The Happy Convention."'
40
Professor Quirk is concerned that our society, whose Constitution as-
sumes that sovereignty is in the people, is becoming "the first historical example
of a majority of self-governing people voluntarily turning over their power to
some guardians" - the guardians being the President and the Supreme Court
rather than the Congress, which was intended to be the main outlet for the
people's power. 141 The main goals of Quirk's book are (1) to alert the people to
the great power they were intended to have in Congress, and then (2) to suggest
means for bringing about a better separation of powers so that Congress is not
left to concentrate on its favorite power - spending money. 1
42
Quirk explains that since Congress has been so quiescent, the political
struggle over wartime issues and other foreign policy matters has become large-
ly a struggle between the President and the Court. The latest round has gone to
the Court, which held 5-4 in Boumediene v. Bush 4 3 that aliens charged with
being enemy belligerents and detained at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to bring
139 QUIRK, supra note 5. William Quirk is a Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
School of Law.
140 Quirk states, "The new, unwritten constitution is called here the Happy Convention. The
Happy Convention is an informal rearrangement of government powers by which each of the three
branches assigns many of its constitutional responsibilities to other branches." Id. at 2.
141 Id. at 31.
142 Quirk summarizes his theme as follows:
Congress. under the Convention, gives the Court the last word on the coun-
try's cultural, social, and moral issues. It gives the President a largely free
hand in foreign affairs, going to war, and national security. The Court and
president are happy to take on additional power. Congress retains the powers
it wants, e.g., spending, which help keep its members in office - but it out-
sources its responsibilities.
Id. at 101.
143 553 U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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habeas corpus in the federal courts because the military commissions set up by
Congress, at the request of the President, did not provide procedures adequate to
be a substitute for habeas corpus.
Quirk suggests several interpretations of the Constitution that would
help make it easier for the federal government to overcome the Happy Conven-
tion. To begin with, the Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison1
44
should be understood, as Quirk says it was by President Lincoln, as establishing
that in a case before the Court, the Court has the duty and power of deciding
what was constitutional. However, the other branches are not bound by that
decision. 145
Next, Quirk suggests that Congress should feel free to strip the Court of
appellate jurisdiction in many situations. In three Appendices he tells the story
of a number of strippers that were enacted by Congress and upheld by the Court.
As for United States v. Klein,1 6 which some have interpreted as holding that the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause must be accommodated with other provi-
sions in the Constitution to insure that Congress, by stripping the Court of juris-
diction, does not deprive the Court of its constitutional role to interpret the Con-
stitution,147 Quirk appears to approve a statement by current Chief Justice Ro-
berts, who, while serving as a special assistant to the Attorney General, wrote
that the Act in Klein "was unconstitutional because it granted the Court j urisdic-
tion but then limited the Court's consideration of the relevant law."1 48 As thus
interpreted, the decision would have little relevance to the usual stripper bill.
The book is an interesting read because Professor Quirk supplies so
much historical evidence in support of his conclusions. For those who demand
thoroughly balanced presentations on political issues, there will be disappoint-
ment. On the other hand, for those who want to see what can be said in favor of
a change in relationships between Congress and the Court and, as well, the Pres-
ident, and to what substantive policies this might lead, there is much to enjoy.
For example, Quirk states flatly, "The Happy Convention's debt habits will
144 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
145 QUIRK, supra note 5 (discussing Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4. 1861
(cited in 4 BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (1953) ("[T]he can-
did citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be
their own rules, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal."))).
146 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
147 See generally Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialetic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner. Congression-
al Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1961); Martin H.
Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Ex-
ceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982).
148 QUIRK, supra note 5, at 288.
[Vol. 112
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss2/5
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
bankrupt the country." 149 Again, "The Happy Convention didn't invent the ba-
sic deceptions built into the Social Security system, but it transformed a middle
class irritant into a major hit."'"5
Despite all of Quirk's talk about the need for change, one senses that
Quirk does not feel that he is beginning a movement with much chance for suc-
cess in modifying the Happy Convention. In a particularly poignant paragraph
opening Chapter 6, entitled "Life under the Happy Convention," Quirk states:
A citizen living under the Happy Convention leads a life of fru-
stration. The Court has no respect for the majority's values so
culture war issues explode like roadside bombs. The citizen
might well prefer not to hear about homosexual rights, flag
burning, Ten Commandment plaques, abortion, atheist rights,
and the death penalty for minors. But the citizen has no choice.
The press, full of volatile, intemperate debate, intrudes on his
life. This is not only distasteful but pointless, considering that
the citizen, if he doesn't like what the Court has done, can't do
anything about it. The electoral process, under the Happy Con-
vention, is next to useless. The constitutional amendment
process, under the Convention, is dead as a doornail. The
Court's rulings, under the Convention, cannot be changed.' 5
Since the modern era of Supreme Court activism was inaugurated by
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,152 Quirk's concern has been echoed by a
number of other writers, 5 3 including Professor Louis Lusky in his 1993 book,
Our Nine Tribunes: The Supreme Court in Modern America. 5 4 As Professor
Lusky indicates in his book, the debate began even earlier in 1938 in the famous
footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products, Inc. " In this famous foot-
note, the Supreme Court sketched three types of situations in which the normal
presumption of constitutionality and deference to the legislature might not be
appropriate:
149 Id. at 135.
150 Id. at 139.
151 Id. at 129.
152 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153 See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1986); JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1973); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980): Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
154 Louis LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA (1 993).
155 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938).
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(1) There may be narrower scope for operation of the presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth....
(2) It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.
(3) Nor need we enquire whether . . . statutes directed against
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities. . . . [or]
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. 156
As Professor Lusky pointed out, paragraph one of footnote 4 in Justice
Stone's opinion in Carolene Products was added at the suggestion of Chief Jus-
tice Hughes, and rests on different premises than paragraphs two and three.
Paragraphs two and three of footnote 4 affirm "self-government" principles:
paragraph two affirms a commitment to government "by the people[,]" and pa-
ragraph three focuses on government "by the whole people[,]" which includes
discrete and insular minorities. Paragraph one's commitment to specific protec-
tions in the Constitution, particularly the first ten amendments that focus mostly
on protecting individuals from the government, and which are applicable to the
states through being incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, is based more on "individual autonomy" concerns, not "self-
government." 
157
From this perspective, Professor Quirk's and Lusky's concerns really
come down to whether one thinks the framers and ratifiers were more concerned
only about the Court interpreting the Constitution to advance self-government,
and deferring to the other political branches in other cases (and, thus, support
heightened Court scrutiny based only on Carolene Products footnote 4 para-
graphs two and three), or whether one thinks the framers believed individuals
had natural law autonomy rights to be free from government regulation which
they expected the Court to protect (as in Carolene Products footnote 4 para-
156 Id. (citations omitted).
157 See LUSKY, supra note 154, at 123 30.
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graph one). Judges and commentators who believe the former tend to share
Justice Holmes' strong posture of judicial deference to government, reflected on
the recent Supreme Court in opinions by Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts.
Judges and commentators, who share the latter premise, tend to approach consti-
tutional doctrine more from the natural law perspective of Chief Justice John
Marshall and Justice Story, reflected on the recent Supreme Court in opinions
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. '5 8
As Quirk's critique of the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledges,
since Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Court has adopted more the
natural law approach, rather than the Holmesian approach, to constitutional in-
terpretation. By so doing, the Court has increased autonomy rights for individu-
als from government, including rights of minorities not to suffer pervasive dis-
crimination, have better assured individuals of their freedom to speak, and have
provided criminal defendants with some rights to protect them from unjustified
convictions.
In our view, Quirk's book would have been a better source for though-
tful appraisal of the current governmental situation in the United States if Quirk
had presented arguments "the other way" regarding some of these consequences
of modern Supreme Court decision-making with as much detail and gusto as he
presented his own views and the historical events he believes show support for
those views. On the other hand, the author has shown that he is not intimidated
by political correctness or by the aura of respectability associated with many
organizations. He asserts, for example, "The ABA and the rest of the legal es-
tablishment have not helped the public understand the Constitution."'" 9 He has
called the shots as he sees them. And, had he engaged in such a detailed presen-
tation of opposing views, his book would have been a tome instead of a readable
collection of generalities plus historical support that now appears in its relatively
short 211 pages of main text, followed by eighty-three pages of historical ap-
pendices on stripping legislation.
The bottom line is that a reader already tending to believe Quirk's main
thesis will have that belief strengthened by this book. However, a reader tend-
ing the other way will not likely be persuaded to change his or her mind because
the arguments which might be used to evaluate, qualify, or weaken Quirk's po-
sitions, are not dealt with in this book. Nonetheless, even disbelievers or doub-
ters still might enjoy reading about what can be said against the "Happy Con-
vention" by a talented writer who enjoys dealing with history.
158 See generally supra notes 75-136 and accompanying text (comparing the Holmesian versus
natural law style of interpretation in specific cases). For further discussion of the natural law
versus Holmesian difference in constitutional interpretation in the context of the issues raised by
Professors Quirk and Lusky. see Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Our Nine Tribunes: A
Review of Professor Lusky's Callfor Judicial Restraint, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1289 (1995).
For discussion of natural law versus Holmesian constitutional interpretation more generally, see
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 303-24, 354-404.
159 QUIRK, supra note 5, at 106.
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C. Professor Farber and Natural Law Versus Instrumentalism
The Ninth Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights - the first ten
Amendments, which in 1833 in Barron v. Baltimore 16 were held to be limited
to the federal government. 161 The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."'' 62 In his latest book, Retained by the
People: The "Silent" Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Ameri-
cans Don't Know They Have, Professor Daniel A. Farber first observes that the
Ninth Amendment appears in only one Supreme Court concurring opinion.1
63
He then sets forth how he thinks judges should reason when finding limits on
government power with aid from the Ninth Amendment.
Farber says that even without overruling Barron v. Baltimore, the prin-
ciples of the Ninth Amendment should apply to restrain powers of the states as
well as the federal government. The reason is that those principles are included
within the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(which Farber abbreviates as the "P or I Clause"). 164 The P or I Clause provides:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . ,,165 Farber reasons that the
Ninth Amendment is an acknowledgment that citizens of the United States have
certain retained rights, which are privileges and immunities under both natural
law and the Bill of Rights. Thus, they are protected from state action by the P or
I Clause.166 Contra to Farber's analysis, the Supreme Court held, in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, that those privileges or immunities were limited to a citizen's
relationships with the federal government, rather than applying the Bill of
Rights or other unspecified natural rights against the states. 167
Consistent with Farber's wishes, the Supreme Court has frequently ap-
plied vigorous scrutiny to both federal and state deprivations of certain unenu-
merated rights or Bill of Rights provisions designated as "fundamental." It has
done so, however, under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.168 Farber argues that this reasoning with
160 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
161 Id. at 247.
162 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
163 FARBER. supra note 6, at x (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg.
J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan. J., concurring) (striking down a ban on counseling the use
of contraceptives, applied to a married couple)). Daniel Farber is a Professor of Law, University
of California Law School, Berkeley.
164 FARBER. supra note 6. at 73.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
166 FARBER. supra note 6. at 68 70.
167 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873).
168 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (unenu-
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regard to unenumerated rights is less soundly based than use of the Ninth
Amendment because that Amendment explicitly recognizes the existence of
such rights. During the time of the framers, those rights were thought to inhere
in natural law, as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. Today such
rights are increasingly recognized in international law, and in the law and the
practices of many other nations, as well as our own.169
Farber criticizes conservatives generally, and Justice Scalia in particu-
lar, for saying that they are unable to find a meaning in the Ninth Amendment or
for refusing to use it from fear of being labeled judicial activists. 17 At the op-
posite extreme, Farber challenges libertarians who would use the Ninth
Amendment to protect a right to do whatever one wants whenever it is
wanted.1 71 He suggests a method for dealing with the Ninth Amendment that he
thinks should produce reasoned decisions. 172 He also explores results from use
of that method in dealing with current issues relating to unenumerated rights -
some of which have been recognized in Supreme Court opinions, and some of
which have yet to be so recognized. 13
The book is divided into four parts. Part I, on Unwritten Rights and the
Constitution, builds on quotations from James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John
Marshall, and Joseph Story to show that during the Founding era the idea of
unwritten rights flowing from natural law was supported in many ways, includ-
ing English common law and the law of nations. 174 The idea was captured in
the opening of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness."1 75 Farber shows how concern was expressed that the
new federal government might have power to invade some of those rights, and
that James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights as a defense. The Ninth
Amendment was Madison's answer to the "exclusivity argument," that listing
certain rights in the Constitution would be understood as a denial of other
rights. 176
merated rights cases); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (summarizing funda-
mental Bill of Rights provisions).
169 FARBER, supra note 6, at 184, 190-91.
170 Id. at 10 11. Farber states that Justice Scalia "and company" are "radicals in black robes."
Id. at 192.
171 Id. at 12-13.
172 Id. at 108.
173 See generally id. at 111 72. The issues Farber discusses include reproductive rights, the
end of life, gay rights, education, the right to government protection. the right to travel, and other
rights.
174 Id. at 25.
175 Id. at 22 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE).
176 Id. at 40-41.
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Prior to the Civil War, Congress did little regulating and so there was no
reason to raise the Ninth Amendment as a defense to federal regulation. As a
result, says Farber, the Ninth Amendment faded from view. 7 After the Civil
War there were efforts to abolish slavery and to protect the human rights of
former slaves. The Civil War Amendments resulted, and there was a new basis
for protecting unenumerated rights against action by the states.
Part II, on Protecting Fundamental Rights, is preceded by Farber mak-
ing clear that floor debate on the Fourteenth Amendment suggested that the P or
I Clause was intended to overrule Barron v. Baltimore. 78 In 1873, however, the
Court gave the P or I Clause a narrow interpretation in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 179 saying that the P or I Clause protected only a short list of rights which
owed their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws. Supplying a few examples, the Court spoke of coming to
the seat of government to assert any claim on the government, free access to its
seaports, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to use navigable
waters, and the right to peacefully assemble and petition government for redress
of grievances. "0 When the Court began to expand the protection of unenume-
rated rights in the 1900s in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska (right to teach and
learn in English); Skinner v. Oklahoma (strict scrutiny of classifications in a
compulsory sterilization law); and Griswold v. Connecticut (use of contracep-
tives by married persons),1 81 the Court had long since stopped talking about
natural law, it had never used the Ninth Amendment, and it settled on the Due
Process Clause as the primary source for reasoning about unenumerated rights
that could be considered "fundamental," and whose deprivation triggered strict
scrutiny. 182
As for determining what rights are "fundamental," the Court said in the
1930s that the test was whether a right was essential to "ordered liberty," so
that abolishing it would violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.18 3 Since then the
Court has gradually softened its test and has enlarged the scope of personal in-
terests that qualify as being fundamental. Farber praises as true to the vision of
James Madison and his generation Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 8 4 where the Court struck down a Texas statute that made homosexual
sodomy a crime. Justice Kennedy spoke of intimate, personal choices central to
177 Id. at 46.
178 Id. at 68 70 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 321 U.S. 243, 247 51 (1833)).
179 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 79 80 (1873).
180 Id.
181 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 85 (1965): Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535. 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
182 FARBER. supra note 6. at 83.
183 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (citations omitted).
184 539 U.S. 558. 566 75 (2003).
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personal dignity and autonomy, and relied on a variety of sources summarized
by Farber:
* The general thrust of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
privacy issues, which tended to reject interference with intimate
relationships;
* State court decisions holding sodomy laws unconstitutional
under their own state constitutions;
* A strong trend toward abolition of sodomy laws by state legis-
latures;
* Decisions of international human rights tribunals, particularly
in Europe, that had rejected sodomy bans. 185
Farber says that Justice Kennedy's approach is not an invitation to judi-
cial activism. It actually restrains the Court by making it a part of a larger com-
munity of courts and lawmakers. 1
8 6
Farber concludes Part II by setting out his own list of criteria for deter-
mining when an alleged right deserves Ninth Amendment protection. The list of
seven factors that Farber says should be considered in determining under the
Ninth Amendment whether a given right is fundamental is as follows:
* Supreme Court precedent establishing the right or analogous
rights;
* Connections with specific constitutional guarantees;
* Long standing, specific traditions upholding the right;
* Contemporary societal consensus about the validity of the
right;
* Decisions by American lawmakers and judges recognizing the
right;
* Broader or more recent American traditions consistent with
the right;
* Decisions by international lawmakers and judges recognizing
the right. 87
185 FARBER, supra note 6, at 89.
186 Id. at 95.
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In Part III, on Applying the Ninth Amendment, Professor Farber con-
siders some specific issues that the Court has or may consider in the future.
Using his approach to identifying fundamental rights under the Ninth Amend-
ment, he offers suggestions on how those matters should be resolved. On abor-
tion, Farber says that a state should not be able to ban all abortions before the
eighth week, 88 and should not be able to prevent abortions for the life or health
of the mother, rape or incest, or because of a deformed fetus.' 89 He approves
the "undue burden" test of Casey. 190
Regarding the end of life, he would find, with the Court, that there is a
right to refuse medical treatment.' 9' However, he thinks that not enough is
known about the effect of laws barring assisted suicide for the Court to hold
today that there is a fundamental right to assisted suicide, at least in the absence
of permanent, agonizing pain. Thus, he agrees with the Court's holding in
Washington v. Glucksberg. 192 He favors the conclusion, in accord with Justice
Kennedy's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, that homosexual sodomy cannot be
criminalized. 93 However, limiting "marriage" to heterosexuals might rationally
be justified by a need for greater stability in such relationships because of child-
ren. Accordingly, he says, the time has not yet come for finding a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage. 
194
Farber unhesitatingly affirms that at least a minimum level of education
is a fundamental right that states must provide, as must the federal government
in the District of Columbia. Farber disagrees with the Court's failure to hold, in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, that there is a fundamen-
tal right to education.195 A fundamental right should also be recognized, says
Farber, in obtaining protection from violence when a law enforcement official is
aware that violence is occurring and has a reasonable opportunity to deal with
it. 196
187 Id. at 108.
188 Id. at 113.
189 Id. at 114.
190 Id. at 115. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "undue
burden" test.
191 FARBER. supra note 6. at 124.
192 Id. at 129 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
193 Id. at 137 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
194 Id. at 141.
195 Id. at 153 (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no right to
equal educational funding under the United States Constitution)). The Court has not yet defini-
tively resolved the question of a right to minimal funding. as opposed to equal funding addressed
in Rodriguez. See generally Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (Rodriguez has "not yet
definitively settled ... whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and wheth-
er a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal
protection review.").
196 FARBER. supra note 6. at 139.
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According to Farber, there is a fundamental right to travel within a state,
between states, and internationally. 197 Going well beyond the cases, he suggests
that there is also a fundamental right to possess one's home unless there is a
need for building a highway or urban renewal and no feasible and prudent alter-
native. 198 And the Constitution should give some protection to informational
privacy by restricting the government from disclosure of personal informa-
tion.' 99
In Part IV on Broader Implications, Farber analyzes what kind of deci-
sion-making should accompany use of the Ninth Amendment and the P or I
Clause to define and protect minority rights. He expresses the matter in a varie-
ty of ways, summarized in this statement: Good constitutional decisions involve
neither the mechanical application of formal rules nor the freewheeling ways of
pure politics. They rely instead on judgment and discretion, which by definition
incorporate both flexibility and constraints.0
Regarding constraints on the recognition of further unenumerated fun-
damental rights, Farber mentions the selection process, the isolation of judges,
the extensive use of precedent in constitutional law, and a common preference
for evolutionary rather than radical change. With regard to citing foreign and
international law, Farber points out that this has been done in many Supreme
Court opinions since the beginning, and makes sense because "when other ca-
pable people are struggling earnestly with the same issues that concern us, it is
foolish to ignore their efforts.,
21
Farber closes his book by noting that protecting fundamental rights is
one of the great American traditions. It stretches from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence to Madison's framing of the Ninth Amendment, and from the creation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Supreme Court's modern case law. 20 2 It
seems clear that Farber's vision for using the Ninth Amendment and the P or I
Clause to protect individuals from government action does not signal a cam-
paign for extremely creative extensions of existing law. Speaking of informa-
tional privacy, Farber approves of Justice Breyer's position, stating that "it may
be useful for courts to take small steps in this area.,
20 3
Professor Farber has selected a topic not much discussed in legal litera-
ture. He has addressed what could be a dry subject in a remarkably readable
fashion. The reader is sent back into history, brought forward, presented with a
theory of interpretation, and then shown how it can be applied to a variety of
fact situations. The basic materials should be familiar to any person who has
197 Id. at 166.
198 Id. at 169.
199 Id. at 171.
200 Id. at 176.
201 Id. at 195.
202 Id. at 200.
203 Id. at 172.
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taken a course on constitutional law, but Professor Farber has provided interest-
ing details that would not ordinarily be provided in a basic course.
Fans of Justice Kennedy will enjoy Professor Farber's frequent praise of
how Justice Kennedy's views accord with those of the framers. Fans of Justice
Scalia may be turned off by Farber's frequent criticism. The underlying tension
is of course quite familiar to anyone who has been reading current Supreme
Court opinions. Justice Scalia, as well as Justices Thomas and Alito, tend to
approach constitutional interpretation as formalists, who believe in a static or
fixed Constitution that does not evolve in meaning over time, but rather whose
meaning is determined primarily by literal interpretation and respect for histori-
cal traditions.2 °4 Justice Kennedy's approach mirrors the early natural law law-
yers', including Chief Justice John Marshall, who believed more in an evolving
Constitution based on enlightened reasoning about the natural law principles
placed into the Constitution by the framers and ratifiers. 205 A complete theory
of current Supreme Court decision-making would have to note that there are two
other views regarding constitutional interpretation: (1) the liberal instrumental-
ism of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; 20 6 and (2) the deference to gov-
ernment Holmes-like posture of Chief Justice Roberts.2 °7
There is no reason to believe that any of the Justices are not doing their
sincere best to discover and apply interpretations of the Constitution in a way
which comports with their most deeply held views on the nature of the Constitu-
tion and the proper role of the Court. Thus, Professor Farber might well have
taken a slightly more temperate view of Justices other than Kennedy. However,
he is to be praised for the cautious and reasoned way that he applies his criteria
for deciding Ninth Amendment cases. It is clear from those applications, as
described above, that his approach does not necessarily lead to a revolution in
constitutional law, as he assures his readers several times.2 °8
As noted above, Farber indicates that seven factors should be used in
determining rights under the Ninth Amendment: (1) precedent, (2) specific con-
stitutional guarantees, (3) long-standing traditions, (4) contemporary societal
consensus, (5) legislation, (6) recent traditions, and (7) international lawmak-
ing. 209 A more-structured approach, related to the four styles of deciding used
by current Justices, would organize these sources as in Tables I and 2 presented
in Part II.2  As those tables indicate, a formalist, like Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito, will focus on text, context, and historical sources of constitutional
interpretation, believing that only sources contemporaneous with ratification of
204 See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 33 34.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 31 32.
208 FARBER. supra note 6. at 91, 181, 198.
209 See supra text accompanying note 187.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
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a constitutional provision should be used (in Farber's terms, specific guarantees
in the Constitution and long-standing historical traditions existing at the time of
ratification upholding the right). Under this approach, the Constitution's mean-
ing will be fixed at ratification. For a Holmesian judge, such as Chief Justice
Roberts and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, it is also appropriate to look for the
purpose behind a provision and to consider and often defer to subsequent prac-
tice (in Farber's terms, legislation by American lawmakers after ratification
recognizing the right and broader or more recent American traditions consistent
with the right since ratification). For a natural law judge, like Justice Kennedy
or former Justices O'Connor and Powell, interpretation begins with the text,
context, history, and subsequent practice. However, beyond these sources used
by formalists and Holmesians, great weight is also given to precedents, both
core holdings of precedent and reasoned elaboration of general principles that
can be found in the Constitution or precedents (in Farber's terms, Supreme
Court precedent establishing the right or analogous rights; and recent recogni-
tion of a right by American judges). Instrumentalist Justices consider all of
these sources and, in addition, the predicted consequences of alternative deci-
sions, evaluated in light of prudential or policy considerations (in Farber's
terms, contemporary social consensus).
21
In his list of seven factors, Farber also states that decisions by interna-
tional lawmakers and judges recognizing a right are also properly considered.
212
For a natural law judge like Justice Kennedy, whose general perspective Farber
seems to favor, such international decisions should only be used by American
judges to the extent they help the understanding of some general principle that
the framers and ratifiers placed into the Constitution, rather than the instrumen-
talist focus on whether the international decision is merely good public policy.
Since many of the framers and ratifiers believed in natural law, many of the
individual rights in the Constitution were likely understood to have a universal
natural law base.21 3
Perhaps the most relevant impediment to Professor Farber's approach
for direct use of the Ninth Amendment by the Court is not the views of formal-
ists, who of course can be expected to oppose this development on grounds that
the Ninth Amendment does not literally specify any particular rights, or a Hol-
mesian judge, on grounds the Court should defer to government action unless
the unconstitutionality of the law is clear, but the great respect for precedent
211 See generally FARBER, supra note 6, at 113 14.
212 Id. at 108.
213 See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 365-66 (citing Sarah H. Cleveland, Our
International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006) (discussing cases where the Constitution
refers to international law or international law is used as a background principle to identify the
territorial scope of the Constitution, the powers of the national government, delineate structural
relationships within the federal system. or individual rights cases); David Fontana. Refined Com-
parativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539. 575 83 (2001) (discussing judicial
practice from 1789 through the Civil War)).
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held by the natural law swing Justice - Justice Kennedy. As Professor Farber
indicates, the Supreme Court has never explicitly relied upon the Ninth
Amendment as an independent source for recognizing rights. 214 To the extent
Professor Farber wishes additional unenumerated fundamental rights to be pro-
tected by the Supreme Court, it seems that the Ninth Amendment is more likely
to be used, if at all, as "collateral support" for rights developed through expan-
sion of existing substantive due process doctrine (or reinterpretation of the P or I
Clause). 215
Under a "collateral support" view, the Ninth Amendment means just
what it says, that is, that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution
should not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
From this perspective, the Ninth Amendment is a reminder of the background
natural law theory that individuals have unalienable rights the government is
created to protect 6 As has been noted,
The Founding generation disagreed about many things, but the
existence of natural rights was not one of them. From James
Madison to Roger Sherman, from The Federalist Papers to the
Antifederalist papers, both supporters and opponents of the
Constitution repeatedly affirmed their shared belief in natural
rights. Virtually all commentators agree that the [f]ramers and
ratifiers of the Bill of Rights believed in natural rights as a gen-
eral matter. 17
As Farber indicates, one concern that Madison and others had in draft-
ing the Bill of Rights was that under the maxim of construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies exclusion of others),
the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights might suggest that the
federal government had plenary power over all other matters.21 8 Since that view
was inconsistent with the intent of the framers and ratifiers that the federal gov-
ernment be a government of limited, delegated power, the Ninth Amendment
was an attempt to craft language to prevent federal governmental power from
being construed in any broader way. Based on an exhaustive look at the history
and precedents of the Ninth Amendment, Professor Kurt Lash has noted:
214 FARBER, supra note 6, at 1-2.
215 That door was partially opened in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (citizens of the United
States have a right protected by the P or I Clause to go to any state they choose and become citi-
zens therein with an equality of rights with every other citizen).
216 See generally Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1988): David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor
MeAffee. 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54
U. Cmu. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
217 Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?. 100 YALE L.J. 1073.
1974 75 (1991) (citations omitted).
218 See FARBER, supra note 6, at 33.
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One of the original purposes of the Ninth Amendment was to
prevent the Bill of Rights from being construed to suggest that
congressional power extended to all matters except those ex-
pressly restricted. As Joseph Story would later write in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States:
[The Ninth Amendment] was manifestly introduced to pre-
vent any perverse, or ingenious misapplication of the well
known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases im-
plies a negation in all others; and e converso, that a nega-
tion in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others.
The maxim, rightly understood, is perfectly sound and safe;
but it has often been strangely forced from its natural mean-
ing into the support of the most dangerous political here-
sies. The amendment was undoubtedly suggested by the
reasoning of the Federalist on the subject of a general bill of
rights.2 19
From this perspective, the Ninth Amendment is a reminder that in inter-
preting all of the other clauses of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights
and the Civil War Amendments, there is reason to use a natural law theory of
interpretation, which supports background natural rights, even if not specifically
enumerated in constitutional text. Farber's book promotes this result, but differs
from this perspective, since under a "collateral support" view the development
of rights will be done primarily under substantive due process analysis, as cur-
rently done, and not the Ninth Amendment.
Professor Farber has written an interesting and readable book on a
clause in the Constitution not discussed much in the constitutional literature, the
Ninth Amendment. While provocative in trying to resuscitate the Ninth
Amendment as an independent source of fundamental rights persons may have
against state and federal governments, long-standing Supreme Court precedent
suggests that the Court will likely continue to develop the fundamental rights
doctrine through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and not the Ninth Amendment, as Farber advocates.
In addition, no matter which clause of the Constitution is used- Ninth
Amendment or Due Process - there is a question of which of Farber's seven
factors regarding interpretation a majority of the Supreme Court will adopt in
developing a fundamental rights analysis. As indicated above, 220 the seven fac-
tors used will depend on whether the controlling votes on the Court are held by
formalist, Holmesian, natural law, or instrumentalist Justices. It is unlikely in
219 Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REv. 597, 619
(2005) (citing JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1898 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833)).
220 See supra text accompanying notes 209 213.
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any near future a majority of the Court will adopt all seven of Farber's factors,
reflecting an instrumentalist approach to judicial decision-making. Despite his
praise for Justice Kennedy in his book, Kennedy is not likely to make much use
in his decision-making of Farber's factor of contemporary views of good social
policy, and Kennedy will tend to use international sources not based on whether
they appear to be good social policy, but on whether they reflect a natural law
principle ofjustice.21
D. Professor Edward Purcell and Instrunentalism
In his book, Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional
Enterprise,22 2 Professor Edward Purcell notes that the relationship between the
federal government and the states has changed from time to time since the Con-
stitution was ratified. He concludes that this was inevitable and not a bad thing.
The challenge facing government officials has always been to determine what is
most appropriate for current conditions. Purcell adds that even if one believes
in a static Constitution, as do formalists, and that the Constitution should be
interpreted as understood by the framers and ratifiers, they did not have a single
agreed-upon understanding of what relationships had been created between the
federal government and the states or whether certain subjects were exclusively
for the states.223
This view regarding the intent of the framers and ratifiers mirrors the
instrumentalist view of Justice Brennan, and others, that a formalist style of
interpretation is impractical, without regard to whether it is sound as a theoreti-
cal matter. As Justice Brennan once noted about historical intent, "Typically, all
that can be gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about the appli-
cation or meaning of particular constitutional provisions and hid their differenc-
es in cloaks of generality.
' 224
Purcell first inquires into why there was no clear understanding at the
beginning.225 Then Purcell considers the consequences of that fact for Ameri-
226can legal history. He concludes with implications for relationships today
221 See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 12, 54 62. 354-404 (discussing the natural
law theory of interpretation, and its use by. among others, Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice
Story, and, more recently, to various degrees, Justices Powell. O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
The instrumentalist leanings of Justice Souter, perhaps closer to Professor Farber's views, are
discussed at id. at 400-04. The non-instrumentalist, and occasionally formalist, leanings of Jus-
tice Kennedy are discussed at id. at 393-94.
222 PURCELL. supra note 7. Purcell is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York
Law School.
223 Id. at 17.
224 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986).
225 PURCELL, supra note 7, at 17-20 (Part I. "Structural Intrinsics").
226 Id. at 85 (Part i1. "Consequential Dynamics").
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within and between the states, and between the states and the federal govern-
ment. 
227
In Part I ("Structural Intrinsics"), Purcell provides copious contempo-
rary quotations by framers and others which show that there was no single orig-
228inal understanding of the Constitution regarding issues of federalism. Fur-
ther, it is unlikely that there could have been any such understanding because of
four characteristics of the Constitution regarding relationships between the fed-
eral government and the states. Those four characteristics, says Purcell, were
that federalism in the Constitution was double blurred, fractionated, instrumen-
tal, and contingent. 29  Purcell's explanations of these four characterizations
follow.
"Double blurred" refers to the fact that the Constitution recognized two
levels of government (states and federal) which had overlapping powers whose
boundaries were not clearly identified.2 30 "Fractionated" refers to the fact that
the Constitution created a federal government that had three different sources of
power that could affect the states differently from time to time. 23' The Constitu-
tion is "Instrumental" in that from concern about power abuses by different fac-
tions, the Constitution has built-in devices to allow one level or branch to check
232another. Constitutional provisions were "Contingent" in that the Constitution
contained many concepts that would inevitably evolve over time, such as
"common Defence," "general Welfare," and "Commerce," and it provided for
its own amendment.233 Thus, Purcell concludes that there were too many ambi-
guities and elasticities to define any single and correct balance between states
234and the nation.. And even if there were at the beginning, it would have been
impossible to maintain a definitive boundary between state and national authori-
ties in view of rapidly changing conditions in technology, business, and social
arrangements.235
The depth of Purcell's scholarship is most evident in Part II ("Conse-
quential Dynamics"). Writing from a broad general perspective but including
pin-point detail, Purcell considers events relating to federalism from four differ-
ent perspectives. First, there were efforts in the political sphere that involved
relations within and among the states to compete and to cooperate for various
ends thought desirable.236 Second, there were activities by each of the branches
227 Id. at 189 (Part 11. "Conclusion").
228 Id. at 17 20.
229 Id. at 6.
230 Id. at 17.
231 Id. at 38.
232 Id. at 53.
233 Id. at 69.
234 Id. at 85.
235 Id. at 76.
236 Id. at 86 93.
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of the federal government, including administrative agencies, to influence
237events that involved the states.. Third, there have been various competing
theories of federalism in the courts and in the political events that influence who
serves on the courts. 238 Finally, he discusses views on the values alleged to be
served by federalism, e.g., by leaving certain matters to the states as policy or as
constitutionally required. z39
The first of three main values asserted by some to be served by federal-
ism is "preserving liberty., 240  Purcell points out, however, that the United
States government was designed to protect liberty and to be the remedy for local
abuses z.24 And, as for the practical workings of federalism, the states failed to
act as checks in World War I years, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, or during
242the McCarthy era. Indeed, the states indulged in parallel abuses.
The second value advanced for federalism is that it supports the states
as "independent laboratories" for constructive experiments. In response, Purcell
noted that this offers no help in identifying specific lines between state and na-
tional authority, and that the Constitution was intended to prevent experimenta-
tion with the fundamental rights of individuals.2 43
A third value offered for federalism is that decentralized government
protects distinctly "local" values and interests. However, from the Civil War
onward there has been much movement toward homogenization in the United
States. Americans now rely on the same sources for information, education, and
244
entertainment. 2  The disappearance of authentically local ideas has been evi-
denced in the development of uniform laws that respond to integrated and ex-
panding national and international markets. Also, some of the local values held
most firmly in the 18th century, slavery among them, have been repudiated by
constitutional provisions, national legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and a
developing national culture. 245 Further, local issues that absorb contemporary
Americans increasingly are manifestations of problems common across the na-
tion.246
237 Id. at 99-108.
238 Id. at 159-40.
239 Id. at 161-86.
240 Id. at 162.
241 Id. at 163.
242 Id. at 164.
243 Id. at 165.
244 Id. at 169.
245 Id. at 173.
246 Id. at 175.
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Another change, Purcell says, is that the early concept of "dual federal-
ism" - that there were two sovereigns with specific areas of authority -
evolved into "cooperative federalism" - where federal power is elastic. 24' The
levels of government have overlapping interests and functions and they rely on
political parties and pressure groups to maintain the system's working bounda-
ries.24 8
In his Part III ("Conclusion"), Purcell does not criticize the outcome of
any particular theory of federalism. Instead, he calls for any decision on federal-
ism to be reasoned in terms of the ideals of the Constitution and the anticipated
practical consequences in terms of such values as political democracy and indi-
vidual freedom. He suggests that for federalism issues, as generally in constitu-
tional law, decisions are based on personal viewpoints and interests. He criti-
cizes originalists insofar as their reasoning is based upon a conclusion that the
Constitution sets forth a specific theory on how the national government is re-
lated to state governments. But he admits that he cannot criticize their conclu-
sions to any greater degree than the conclusions of non-originalists because both
are based on personal viewpoints and both, presumably, are sincere efforts to
decide rightly.249
Purcell concludes by advising that the Court could increase the likelih-
ood of reaching wise results in federalism cases by following three general cau-
tions. 250 First, it should recognize that such cases call for careful, flexible, and
pragmatic line-drawing. Second, the Court should carefully analyze and explain
likely consequences. Third, in determining whether any particular decision is
consistent with the "values of federalism," the Court should determine whether
and how the decision would affect both individual rights and open democratic
processes. Only in this way can the Court demonstrate why its federalism deci-
sions are both practically necessary and generally benevolent.
By grounding his jurisprudence ultimately on such pragmatic arguments
of good policy, Purcell adopts, at the end of the day, an instrumentalist approach
to constitutional interpretation. Purcell asserts, and probably correctly, that no
line between the national government and the states could be drawn in terms of
subjects that are "truly local" or "traditional,, 25 1 as Justice Rehnquist attempted
252to do in National League of Cities v. Usery. National League was overruled
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,253 where the Court
held that, despite the Tenth Amendment, the only federalism limit on Con-
gress's power to regulate states directly was the Nation's political process.
247 Id. at 178-79.
248 Id. at 178.
249 Id. at 201.
250 Id. at 204.
251 See id. at 169 73.
252 426 U.S. 833, 849-55 (1976); PURCELL, supra note 7, at 125.
253 469 U.S. 528. 530 31 (1985).
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However, had the Court held consistently to the framing era's "dual theory of
sovereignty" - elaborated in a natural law way consistent with the vision of
Chief Justice Marshall and the Marshall Court - the Court could have be-
queathed to the Nation a workable vision of federalism - a view that might
have survived the many changes reviewed by Purcell.
Under the "dual theory of sovereignty," as explained by Justice Kenne-
dy in US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,254 the genius of our founding genera-
tion was to split sovereignty in the United States system into two parts: states
and federal government. As Chief Justice Marshall had noted in McCulloch v.
Maryland,2 55 the founding generation established dual systems of government
- states and federal government - with each deriving its authority indepen-
dently from the consent of the people. The Constitution, after all, was adopted,
as stated in the first three words of the Constitution, by "We, the People," not
"We, the States." Further, the Constitution was ratified in special state conven-
tions elected specially by the people for that purpose, not ratified by the existing
state legislatures. Thus, in our system, there are two sovereign entities, the fed-
eral government and the states, both created by "the People," which are linked
by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause of Article VI, § 2.
Under this dual theory of sovereignty, the federal government can regu-
late both individuals and states where constitutional power exists under the
United States Constitution, and states can regulate individuals and the federal
government under their own state constitutions and the United States Constitu-
tion consistent with doctrines of intergovernmental immunity. However, the
federal government cannot tell the states in any manner how they should regu-
late their own people because that would be infringing on the states' reserved
sovereign power. Thus, in New York v. United States,2 56 Justice O'Connor
wrote for a 6-3 Court, including Justices Kennedy and Souter, that "Congress
may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.', 257 This
theory was extended in Printz v. United States.258 There a 5-4 Court held that
Congress could not require state officials to conduct a background check on
persons who had applied to purchase a gun.259 Relying on the structural argu-
ments of the dual theory of sovereignty, history, and legislative and executive
practice, the Court concluded that just as Congress could not commandeer the
state legislature in New York, Congress cannot commandeer state executive or
administrative officials in Printz.
254 514 U.S. 779. 838 44 (1995) (Kennedy. J.. concurring).
255 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 402-05 (1819).
256 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
257 Id. at 161.
258 521 U.S. 898, 908-12 (1997).
259 Id. at 935.
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The Court has made it clear that the New York and Printz cases apply
only where Congress attempts to "use" or "commandeer" state officials for fed-
eral purposes. These cases pose no Tenth Amendment limit on Congress's
power to regulate states or individuals directly.260 Thus, in Reno v. Condon,261 a
federal act barring unconsented disclosure of driver's license information was
applied to both the states and private persons. The Court stated that New York
and Printz did not apply where the federal exercise of Commerce Clause power
regulated state activities directly, rather than seeking to control or influence the
262manner in which the states regulated private parties.. In Condon, since the
federal statute regulated state workers at the state's Department of Motor Ve-
hicles, and did not tell those workers how to regulate their own citizens, the
federal act was constitutional. If the federal government attempted to tell states
how to regulate their own citizens, such as requiring individual driver's licenses
to contain certain information or be done in a standardized manner, that would
likely be viewed as commandeering.
Regarding direct regulation of individuals and states by the federal gov-
ernment, the modern broad power to regulate, consistent with the 1985 case of
Garcia and 2000 case of Condon, was held to exist by the Marshall Court in
2631824 in Gibbons v. Ogden. In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
"[t]he genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action
is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the states generally., 264 The phrase "internal concerns"
suggests a broad reading of "commerce" to include all kinds of economic activi-
ty. Further, Marshall noted that the term "commerce" in the Commerce Clause
also modified the phrases "with foreign nations" and "with the Indian tribes,"
and that it has been "universally admitted, that these words comprehend every
species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign na-
tions. 26 5 Marshall concluded, "[i]f this be the admitted meaning of the word, in
its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the
sentence" and thus be equally applicable to commerce "among the several
States.266
It has been argued that despite these passages, Marshall conceived of
commerce as not including economic activity other than buying and selling
goods, or transporting them to market, because Marshall indicated in Gibbons
that "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which
260 Id. at 924.
261 528 U.S. 141. 148 51 (2000).
262 Id. at 149-50.
263 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1(1824).
264 Id. at 195.
265 Id. at 193.
266 Id. at 192 95.
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respect turnpike roads, ferries, [etc.,] are component parts of this mass" of sub-
ject-matters for state regulation.267 However, as Marshall made clear in Gib-
bons, while the federal government has "no direct general power over these ob-
jects," the "legislative power of the Union can reach them ... for national pur-
poses," and the federal government "may use means also employed by a State,
in the exercise of its acknowledged power.,
268
With respect to regulating commerce among the states, dealt with in
Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall wrote that "among" may be restricted to commerce
which concerns more states than one.269 However, Congress's power does not
stop at state lines. Although Congress's power does not reach the "exclusively
internal commerce" of the states, Marshall admitted, that concept is limited to
concerns completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states,
and with which Congress has not found it necessary to interfere for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government. 270 Thus, Marshall
brought back into the federal realm what he appeared to take away by the phrase
"exclusively internal commerce." Particularly given integrated markets today,
very little commerce would not "affect other states" or, in particular circums-
tances, would it be true of that Congress would not find it "necessary" to act.
With respect to the power of states to enact laws that do not conflict
with an Act of Congress, Marshall held in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co. 271 that state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating their own purely in-
ternal affairs are constitutional, if not within a constitutional prohibition, unless
272they conflict with an Act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution.
As to what federal laws are within the Constitution, Marshall said in McCulloch
v. Maryland, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Consti-
tution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
,273tution, are constitutional." Means for executing the many great powers, such
as to levy taxes, borrow money, and regulate commerce, were not enumerated,
274said Marshall, but were intended to be ample for executing the great powers.
Chief Justice Marshall and his Court thus interpreted the Constitution to
create a scheme of concurrent federal and state powers to pass laws on many
subjects, each government with power to seek its own legitimate purposes, with
federal law supreme in case of conflict. This scheme might have served well
267 Id. at 203. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1405-08 (1987).
268 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
269 Id. at 194.
270 Id. at 195.
271 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
272 Id. at 252.
273 17U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
274 Id. at 407-08.
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even into the twenty-first century had not the Court in 1851 in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens275 departed from Marshall's reasoning by holding that the exercise
of a power was not to be defined by its purposes but, rather, by the nature of a
subject on which, as a means, the power operates. It was thus up to the Court,
not Congress, said Justice Curtis, to decide whether a subject was exclusively
for legislation by Congress, or exclusively for the states because the subject
required local diversity or was not a matter of interstate commerce, or whether
there was concurrent power. Thus, the Court planted a seed which was later to
grow into many limitations on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause,
and from which the Nation was not freed until the mid-193 0S.
2 7
6
By then, the approach of Marshall in McCulloch and Gibbons was no
longer recalled and the Court turned to tests such as whether a subject of federal
legislation was substantially related to interstate commerce.27  Since the 1940s,
however, the Court has reached results consistent with the Marshall Court ap-
proach, and has upheld congressional power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause any economic activity with some connection to interstate economic ac-
tivity, unless the subject matter of the regulation truly has no economic nexus,
and thus is truly a non-economic act. Thus, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States,278 the Court stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional,
because the activity it regulated - racial discrimination in terms of purchasing
rooms at hotels generally open to the public - was economic in nature and af-
fected the movement of persons across state lines and, thus, the amount of mon-
ey spent in interstate travel.2 9 In Perez v. United States,280 a criminal law ban-
ning extortionate credit transactions was constitutional because of the affect of
275 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
276 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 655-62 (1985);
KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 277-85 (1989). The major cases espousing a narrow view
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause are Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (holding that Congress could not regulate prices. wages, or hours in the mining industry
because mining is a local activity that affects interstate commerce only indirectly) United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that Congress could not regulate crop acreage because farm-
ing is not in interstate commerce); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding that Congress could not regulate prices of a chicken slaughterhouse because the transac-
tions occur after the chickens have come to rest and thus are intrastate); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that Congress could not pass child labor laws to prevent shipment in
interstate commerce of goods made by children who worked longer hours than permitted since the
evil occurred during the manufacturing process before the goods became articles of commerce)
and United States v. E.. Knight Co.. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Antitrust Act could not be
applied to a monopoly in manufacture because "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it.").
277 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-28 (1942): United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 113 19(1941).
278 379 U.S. 241, 250-58 (1964).
279 Id.
280 402 U.S. 146, 150-57 (1971). In his opinion, Justice Douglas said that the view of the
Commerce Clause announced by Justice Marshall in Gibbons had been restored. Id. at 150 51.
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extortionate credit, a crime involving money, on interstate organized crime. On
the other hand, in United States v. Morrison,281 a 5-4 Court held that a statute
regulating gender-motivated violence had no economic nexus, since the statute
was only targeted on violent action and, thus, was not a valid regulation of
282commerce under the Commerce Clause. Similarly, in Lopez v. United
States,283 a 5-4 Court held that mere possession of a gun in a school yard had no
economic nexus.2 84
In both Morrison and Lopez, Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote
for the majority opinion. However, Justice Kennedy made it clear in Lopez that
in his view Heart of Atlanta Motel and Perez were still good law.2 85 In both
Lopez and Morrison the Court's liberal instrumentalists, joined by Justice Sou-
ter, dissented, concluding that as long as the activity regulated could be thought
to have some effect on interstate commerce, whether the activity itself has an
286economic component was irrelevant . Similarly, liberal instrumentalists have
not favored the New York and Printz limitations on Congress's power to regu-
late states under the natural law "dual theory of sovereignty. ' 287 The current
majority on the Supreme Court, however, favors the dual theory of sovereignty,
with Justice Kennedy being the critical fifth vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the five books addressed in this article consider from various
perspectives the role of judges in deciding cases, particularly cases involving
aspects of constitutional law. All of the authors - Judge Richard Posner, Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia and legal scholar Bryan Garner, Professor William Quirk,
Professor Daniel A. Farber, and Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr. - are know-
ledgeable individuals with a felicity for engaging writing. However, like the
famous parable of five different individuals touching different parts of an ele-
phant, and, thus, coming to different conclusions about what kind of animal they
were touching, each book suffers a bit from not placing its analysis firmly into a
broader theoretical perspective on different theories ofjudicial review.
281 529 U.S. 598, 613, 617-18 (2000).
282 Id.
283 514 U.S. 549. 557 59 (1995).
284 Id.
285 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 617 18: Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 59 (Kennedy, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., concurring).
286 See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-40 (Souter. J.. joined by Stevens. Ginsburg &
Breyer. JJ.. dissenting); Lopez. 514 U.S. at 615 16 (Breyer. J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Gins-
burg, JJ.. dissenting).
287 Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 939-40 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter. Ginsburg & Breyer. JJ., dissent-
ing): New York, 505 U.S. 142, 201 02 (White, J.. joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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To summarize and conclude, there are four basic styles of judicial deci-
sion-making: formalism, Holmesian, instrumentalism, and natural law. With
regard to interpretation, whether common-law, statutory or constitutional inter-
pretation, judges who are formalist (or legalist, or textualist) focus on contempo-
raneous sources of meaning - text, context, and history of a provision or com-
mon-law precedent - with a special focus on literal meaning. For constitution-
al law, this leads to a static, or fixed, view of the Constitution, primarily based
on the textual meaning at the time of ratification. Holmesian judges add to con-
temporaneous sources a judicial deference to later legislative, executive, and, to
some extent, social practice. Natural law judges add to these sources great re-
spect for precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law. Instrumentalist (or
pragmatic, or purposivist) judges add a focus on prudential principles. For con-
servative instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight paid to pruden-
tial principles of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this typically in-
volves greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy embedded in
the law. Placed in this perspective, each of these five books makes a good con-
tribution to legal scholarship once the predisposition of the author is understood:
Posner (conservative instrumentalist); Justice Scalia (formalist); Professor Quirk
(Holmesian); Professor Farber (natural law, with a hint of liberal instrumental-
ism), and Professor Purcell (liberal instrumentalist).
2010]
51
Kelso and Kelso: Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The State of the De
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010
52
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss2/5
